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31. Introduction
In the literature it is often assumed that industrialised countries may be committed, for political or moral
reasons, to signing an international environmental treaty and jointly implement emissions reductions of
greenhouse gases in a cost-effective manner (see, e.g., Hoel (1994) and Underdal (1992)). The Kyoto
Protocol aims at a market-based reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases in the industrialised (Annex
B) countries by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012, and serves as a
practical illustration of this tenet1. An important issue is how policy can be designed to increase the
chances that a treaty amongst industrialised countries will attract additional signatories, particularly
developing countries with low abatement cost options. Although these countries may not assist in
covering the net costs of reducing emissions, their involvement can significantly increase the cost-
effectiveness of a given international sacrifice. Moreover, if the risk of global climate change is to be
reduced, it is vital that developing countries - the predicted main future emitter of greenhouse gases -
agree to emissions limitations2.
In general, side payments can be used to transfer resources to the developing countries and thereby
provide incentives for them to participate in an international environmental agreement (Barrett (1992a)
and Carraro et al. (1992, 1993))3. Under a tradable quota scheme, transfers are indirectly determined by
the initial distribution of emissions quotas: If the initial quota of a country exceeds the country’s actual
quota demand measured at the equilibrium quota price, revenue from sales of the resulting surplus
minus incurred abatement costs determine the implicit net transfers received, and vice versa. Hence, an
“appropriate” initial quota allocation can serve as an effective device to attract developing countries’ to
participate in an international tradable quota treaty (Barrett (1992b)). Also, regardless of  the initial
allocation, subsequent trading can lead to a cost-effective outcome (Montgomery (1972)). This potential
for pursuing distributional objectives whilst assuring cost-effectiveness is an important attribute of the
tradable quota approach.
Negotiations on a tradable quota treaty between industrialised and developing countries most likely are
two-dimensional in the following sense. First, the bargaining parties need to agree upon an aggregate
                                                  
1 See http://www.unfccc.de/index.html
2 By 2010, global carbon emissions could be 32% higher than in 1990, even if all industrial nations meet their Kyoto
commitments, according to US Department of Energy (Global Environmental Change Report, Vol. X, No. 9, May 1998).
3 Gilles et al. (1996) argue that developing countries are unlikely to consider themselves responsible for atmospheric
degradation, and may be reluctant to reduce emissions of their own volition.
4emissions target. Second, the negotiations will focus upon an acceptable initial quota allocation between
industrialised and developing countries4. The latter process may be facilitated by reference to some
criteria such as “fairness”, GNP, and others (for an overview, see Rose and Tietenberg (1994)).
Nevertheless, a focal point in a group of papers has been the allocation that would keep developing
countries exactly financially compensated, i.e., implies zero net cost, were they to join (confer, for
instance, Bohm and Larsen (1994) and Bohm (1995)). This allocation yields the least cost to the
industrialised countries at which developing countries could be drawn into an international agreement.
In this paper we consider negotiations on and the prospect for a tradable quota treaty involving
industrialised countries (IC), committed to reducing emissions, and developing countries (DC) which are
considered unlikely to reduce emissions of their own volition. The starting point is an emissions target
which can be assumed to acceptable in that it reduces the chances of unfavourable global warming with
an acceptable probability5. Furthermore, we focus on an initial tradable quota allocation which implies
zero expected net costs to DC, where net costs equal abatement costs plus quota sales revenues minus
quota purchase costs. However, uncertain marginal abatement costs and non-uniform quota prices
(henceforth referred to as uncertainty) affect the distributional implications of this quota allocation. In
particular, uncertainty may adversely influence the assumed risk-averse DC’s incentives to join the
agreement6.
The IC’s response is to play a leadership role by agreeing to compensate DC in order to make it join the
proposed treaty. Consequently, we discuss two compensation options available to IC: (a) extra
emissions quotas to DC, and (b) linking the initial quota allocation that implies zero expected cost DC
with financial transfers from IC. In total, the main purpose of the paper is to analyse and compare the
effectiveness of two compensation options in terms of facilitating a tradable quota treaty.
                                                  
4 We assume that negotiations between developing and industrialised countries on a tradable quota treaty are shaped by
earlier and related negotiations. A case in point is the process leading up to the Kyoto Protocol which involved the
determination of an aggregate emissions cap and an acceptable initial allocation of tradable emissions quotas (also see
Barrett (1998)).
5 This level of emissions may or may not be Pareto optimal. An emissions level is Pareto optimal when the marginal
abatement cost of reducing emissions equal the marginal benefit from reductions. It is difficult to estimate marginal
benefits by any reliable approximation. Therefore the treaty’s objective is cast in terms of an exogenous emissions target
only. The treaty is cost-effective if it achieves the emissions target at the lowest cost possible. An efficient treaty implies
both a Pareto optimal emissions target and cost-effectiveness (Hoel (1993)).
6 Confer IPCC (1996), chapter 11 for a related discussion.
5The paper is organised in five sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 introduces the negotiations
framework and specifies the type of uncertainty considered relevant to the negotiations. Section 3 and 4
examines the properties and analyses the effectiveness of the two compensation strategies, respectively.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The negotiations framework
For simplicity, we discuss the negotiations in terms of  two representative countries DC and IC that
would trade on a perfectly competitive quota market. Also, we assume that IC is committed to, first,
reducing aggregate emissions and, second, inducing DC to join a tradable quota treaty with a total cap
on emissions corresponding to the aggregate emissions target. Third, IC wants DC to commit itself to
non-negative emissions limitations ex-ante quota trade. Subject to these constraints, IC seeks to
minimise the associated costs and is approximately risk-neutral with regard to the incurred costs.
Alternately, DC is risk-averse with regard to the costs implied by participating in the treaty. In addition,
it is reluctant to join unless it is - as a minimum prerequisite - financially compensated.
Let e DC
BAU  and e IC
BAU  denote DC’s and IC’s emissions business-as-usual levels, i.e., when no abatement
of emissions is undertaken. The given emissions target is the sum of the initial quota allocation
allocations $e DC  and $e IC , and is henceforth treated as given. These quotas are taken to be time-limited
and tradable, and may refer to maximum allowable emissions during a five-year period. Thus, the
negotiations concern a treaty that cuts aggregate emissions by at least ( ) ( ){ }e eDCBAU ICBAU DC ICe e+ - +$ $ .
As can be seen in Figure 1, the marginal cost of reducing  emissions in country i - MACi - is assumed to
be linear and increasing in abatement of emissions7. Moreover, valued at the initial quota allocation, the
countries’ marginal abatement costs are asymmetric in that DC offers cheaper abatement options than
does IC. Formally, ( ) ( )MAC e MAC eIC IC DC DC$ $ .>
A cost-effective allocation of emissions (at the end of the considered period) obtains when the countries
reduce their emissions e  and eDC IC  up to the point where the marginal abatement cost equals the
                                                  
7 Abatement options with non-positive costs, so-called ‘no-regrets’ options, are disregarded here. Also, the relative flatness
of MACDC illustrates the assumed low abatement cost options available in DC.
6equilibrium price of an emissions quota - p * . Hence, in equilibrium, DC would export emissions
reductions equal to ( $ )e eDC DC- *  to IC, where eDC*  denotes the market-clearing volume of DC’s
emissions ex-post quota trade.
Figure 1. Tradable quota graphics
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Compared with the initial quota allocation depicted in the figure, quota trade infers efficiency gains
equal to the area (D+E). DC’s and IC’s optimal domestic abatement costs equals (A+B) and C,
respectively. DC’s quota sales revenue corresponds to IC’s quota purchase costs, and is given by the
rectangle (B+E).
Equivalently, and assuming linear MACs, the net costs incurred by DC if choosing to participate in the
treaty can generally be expressed as
7 C p e e p e eDC DC
BAU
DC DC DC= - - -* * * *12 ( ) ( $ )
abatement costs quota sales reveneue6 74 44 84 4 4 6 74 4 84 4
(1)
The BAU level eDC
BAU  in equation (1) can be expected to be reasonably easy to predict, and the initial
quota allocation $eDC  is determined through negotiations. Hence, we assume that these parameters are
certain. Therefore, uncertain net costs may originate from
1. non-uniform quota prices p , and
2. a stochastic market-clearing emissions level ex-post quota trade eDC
* .
The rationale for assuming stochastic p and eDC
*  is that the slopes of the countries’ linear MAC curves
are deemed uncertain. This supposition is illustrated in Figure 1 by means of the dotted lines
surrounding the marginal abatement cost functions, and indicates that the degree of uncertainty
increases in emissions abatement8. Consequently, the random variables p and eDC
*   are defined as
functions over the sample-space created by the depicted intersections of the dotted lines.
For simplicity, we assume that this sample-space is common knowledge amongst the bargaining parties.
A motivation for this approach is that few countries can be expected to accept joining a tradable quota
treaty without needing to evaluate the implied net cost of proposed quota allocations between itself and
others. Therefore, each negotiating party has an incentive to estimate both its own as well as the other
parties’ MACs in order to assess net quota demand and implied expected abatement costs and net quota
sales revenue. Thus, it can be assumed that, as a result of national efforts as well as those of
international organisations, the (confidence intervals of the) MACs of the negotiating parties level will
be common knowledge (confer Bohm (1997a, 1997b)).
However, prior to quota trading the bargaining parties cannot ascertain the objective probability
distribution of neither the quota prices or the market-clearing volume of emissions. The chosen
                                                  
8 In reality, the traded commodities in focus here, emission reductions, will be “consumed” at discrete points in time, i.e.,
the dates when each country has to prove that it has an emission quota large enough to cover its emissions during the past
‘treaty’ period. Thus, holdings of these commodities are useful only at the end of these every five years. Nevertheless,
transactions at current prices can take place at any time during each period. Consequently, the prospect for uncertain prices
may in practice be the most problematic aspect of uncertainty during real-life negotiations (see Bohm (1998)).
8approach is to proceed as if the countries adopt a common prior specifying the underlying probability
distributions as well as the values of the first two moments of the stochastic variables p and eDC
* .
Specifically, the quota prices are supposed to follow a Gamma distribution. In this manner prices are
not restricted apart from being positive:
[ ]f(p) = p  for 0 pa-1e a bbp- £ £ ¥/ ( , )G (2)
where a, b are positive parameters. The mean of the quota price - E(p) - is equal to 
a
b
 whereas its
variance - Var(p) - is given by 
a
b2
.
The distribution of the market-clearing volume of DC’s emissions eDC
*  also needs to be non-negative as
well as confined by upper and lower bounds. Actual  eDC
*  will be treated as a random variable within
the confines of DC’s countries’ BAU emissions levels eDC
BAU  and - for simplicity - 0. Thus, in line with
the stated objective of IC, we disregard the possibility of allocating DC a quota beyond its BAU-level.
Accordingly, we assume that eDC
*  follows a Beta distribution
[ ]f(e ) = (e / m)  with 0 eDC DC c-1 DC* * * - *- £ £( / ) / ( , )1 1e m mB c d mDC d (3)
where c, d signify positive parameters, and m eDC
BAUº  is a scaling parameter which represents the
maximum attainable value for eDC
* . Let the parameters be scaled such that d a cº - 9. The associated
mean and variance then equals e
c
aDC
BAU æ
èç
ö
ø÷  and ( )
( )
( )
e
c a c
a aDC
BAU 2
2 1
-
+
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ , respectively.
                                                  
9 The restriction c+d=a combined with a³ 2 will ensure a distribution of DC’s market-clearing emissions level eDC
*  with a
strictly positive mode instead of a uniform distribution shape (see Hughes Hallett (1994a)).
9Lastly, the quota prices p and market-clearing emissions level eDC
*  are independently distributed. The
motivation for this assumption is two-fold. First, market power is supposed to be negligible. The
rationale for this is that the countries’ right of withdrawal from the agreement provides a significant
check on each signatory’s incentives to manipulate the quota price. Second, the bargaining countries can
be viewed as prospective ‘small’ price-takers in an international tradable quota market.
The outlined specification of stochastic quota prices and DC’s market-clearing emissions volume
facilitates an evaluation of initial quota allocations in terms of DC’s net cost. In as much as the
aggregate emissions target is treated as given, next we consider negotiations on the initial distribution of
the aggregate tradable quota.
3. Negotiation strategies
DC is reluctant to join the tradable quota treaty unless it is financially compensated. Consequently,
negotiations over allocations that yields positive expected cost to DC are ruled out ex-ante. Thus, a
natural starting-point is for a cost-minimising IC to propose the initial quota allocation that yields zero
expected net cost to DC. If deemed acceptable by DC, IC then effectively minimises the cost associated
with facilitating the treaty.
The general expression for DC’s expected net cost is given by the expectation of CDC:
E C E p e e p e e e
a c
b
e
a
bDC DC
BAU
DC DC DC DC
BAU
DC(
abatement costs quota sales reveneue
) ( ) ( $ ) $= - - -
é
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ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
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ø÷ -
* *1
2 2
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(4)
By implication, the initial quota allocation $e e
a c
a
eDC DC
BAU
DC
BAUo = +æèç
ö
ø÷ <2
 implies zero expected net cost to
DC. Equivalently, DC’s expected abatement costs equal exactly its expected quota sales revenue. Since
a c> , this allocation specifies an initial quota smaller than DC’s business-as-usual level10.
However, the variance of DC’s net costs is relevant to the negotiations in so far as DC exhibits risk-
averse preferences. Risk-sensitivity requires DC’s evaluation of the proposed initial allocation to be a
                                                  
10 However, if a c» , then the initial allocation which keeps DC financially compensated is approximately equal to its
BAU-level. Equivalently, such a treaty would entail negligible emissions reductions ex-ante quota trade.
10
function of the second (and possibly higher) moment of its net costs. Accordingly, we first assume that
for a given certain initial net income denoted by M, DC agrees to join the treaty if and only if
{ }E u M C u MDC( ) ( )- ³ (5)
i.e., conditional upon the expected utility from participating being greater than or equal to the country’s
initial welfare. Second, we adopt a mean-variance approach, the implication of which is that the
participation constraint in equation (5) can be rewritten as11
- (  r > 0E C rVar CDC DC) ( ) ,- ³ 0 (6)
where the coefficient r signifies DC’s degree of constant absolute risk-aversion (Varian (1992)). An
advantage of the mean-variance approach is that r reflects the DC’s preference for avoiding risk;
increasing r trades greater security (as indexed by Var(CDC)) for less ambition (as indexed by E(CDC)).
In this case, varying r traces out the trade-off between lower average net costs and greater stability of
these costs.
The variance of DC’s net costs, evaluated at the considered initial allocation $ ,e e
a c
aDC DC
BAUo = +æèç
ö
ø÷2
 is
given by12:
                                                  
11 If [ ]m i jE w E w= - ( )  for j=2,3 ... and w denotes positive income, then E w j j
k
( ) + å a m
2
 is the expectation of
any standard utility function, u(w) say, given suitable values for a j k and = ¥ .  To introduce E(u) as an objective is to
specify that the decisions must follow from a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which associated utility values
with different (risky) outcomes for w and hence the underlying target variables. Truncating the linear combination at k=2
produces the familiar mean-variance decision model, and a computable second-order approximation to the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function.
12 Since p~ G (a,b) and eDC* ~ B (c,d,m), it follows that ( )p eDC× *  will be defined by a Gamma distribution with parameters c
and l=b/m. Hence, Var p e m c
b
e
c
b
DC DC
BAU( ) ( )× = æèç
ö
ø÷ =
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
* 2
2
2
2  (see Hughes Hallett (1994b) for proof).
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which is positive since the quota price p is non-uniform. Inserting the derived expected level and
variance of DC’s net costs in the participation constraint and rearranging, yields
[ ]
 r
E C
Var C e
ab
c a c
DC
DC DC
BAU£ =
-
=( )
( ) ( )
( )
0
4
02
2
(8)
Equation (8) shows that the DC’s participation constraint holds for r = 0 only. Equivalently, the
considered initial quota allocation $eDC
o  attracts DC to join the treaty conditional upon it being risk-
neutral. Thus, when allowing for uncertainty, an initial quota allocation that keeps a risk-averse DC
exactly financially compensated is insufficient to attract its participation in a tradable quota treaty.
Being committed to the specified amount emissions reductions ( ) ( ){ }e eDCBAU ICBAU DC ICe e+ - +$ $  and cost-
effectiveness, IC is willing to provide compensation for uncertainty in order to induce DC to become
party to the tradable quota treaty. A cost-minimising strategy for IC is therefore to propose
compensation just sufficient to make DC join the treaty, given the latter’s degree of risk-aversion. Next
we consider the general properties of two alternative strategies open to IC for providing compensation:
extra emissions quota and financial transfers to DC. A discussion of the effectiveness of the alternative
strategies is deferred to the next section.
Extra emissions quota
This strategy amounts to assigning a larger tradable quota to DC than the initial quota allotment which
implies zero expected net cost, albeit not in excess of DC’s BAU-level. Consequently, the range of
negotiable initial quotas to DC is given by the interval $ , .e e
a c
a
eDC DC
BAU
DC
BAUÎ +æèç
ö
ø÷
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ2
 Since the aggregate
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quota allotment, and thereby the total emissions level, remains unchanged, this strategy implies IC
obtaining a ditto smaller initial quota.
Assuming a competitive quota market, the compensatory quota allotted to DC will be exported and by
that transformed into increased expected quota sales revenue, i.e., similar to a lump sum redistribution
of income. Conversely, the expected cost to IC from agreeing to the extra emissions quota to DC
corresponds to the industrialised country’s increase in expected quota purchase costs. The theoretic
rationale for this is the result proved by Montgomery (1972), namely that the cost-effective and market-
clearing allocation of emissions is independent of the initial quota allocation if the quota price is
competitive and no transactions costs obtain. An additional condition is that income effects of
(moderate) changes in the initial quota allocation are the same across countries, e.g., all insignificant
(Bohm (1992)). Then only the equilibrium volume of quota trade is affected by the change in the initial
quota distribution.
Moreover, we assume that the probability distributions of both p and eDC
* , as well as the parameters of
these distributions, are unaffected by exogenous changes in the initial quota allocation. Then DC’s
expected net cost implied by extra emissions quota equals
( )E(  > 1
abatement costs quota sales reveneue
C E p e e p e e
a c
b
eDC
EQ
DC
BAU
DC DC DC DC
BAU) ( ) ( $ ) ,= - - × -
é
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ù
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* *1
2 1 2
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od d d (9)
where superscript EQ signifies extra emissions quota.
The parameter d measures the extent of extra emissions quota added to the allocation that implies zero
expected cost to DC - $eDC
o . From equation (9) it follows that assigning a larger initial quota to DC -
setting d>1 - reduces its expected net cost through higher expected quota sales revenue.
The variance of net costs implied by the compensatory initial quota is equal to
( )[ ]
Var C Var p e
a c a a c
aDC
EQ
DC
BAU(  > 1) ( )( )
( ) ( ))
,=
- + + +
>2
2 2
2
2 3
4
0
d d
d (10)
